Property by White, J. Spratt, IV
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 19 
Issue 1 1966-1967 Survey Issue Article 13 
1967 
Property 
J. Spratt White IV 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
White, J. Spratt IV (1967) "Property," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 19 : Iss. 1 , Article 13. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss1/13 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
PROPERTY
I. EASEMENTS
A. Broad or Unity Rule
In Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. IWilliamson'1 the court restated
and broadened somewhat the "broad or unity" rule with respect
to easements acquired by grantees who purchase with reference
to the grantor's plat.
2
Stated briefly, the rule in South Carolina has been that a
buyer, purchasing with reference to a plat, has an implied ease-
ment in all the streets and alleys shown on that plat.3
This easement is sometimes confused with those which arise
in favor of the public by dedication when the streets are laid
out and are accepted by the public. The individual, private
easement here comes into being not by dedication, but by
implied grant and is not dependent upon the creation or per-
petuation of any right in the public.
4
In Williamson the respondent had purchased and fenced off
a "turn-around" portion of a street on which his and the appel-
lant's lots abutted. The court held, in line with the settled rule,
that the wall must be removed and the appellants allowed to
use the circle since the appellants had acquired an easement
therein when they purchased with reference to the sub-divider's
plat.
The court used language that seems to go further than neces-
sary when it said, "The purchasers... acquired every easement,
privilege and advantage shown upon said plat, including the
right to the use of all streets, near or remote, as laid down on the
plat .... ),
Billings v. McDaniel,6 the case so frequently relied upon for
the point involved here, and Newton v. Batson,7 a 1953 decision,
both contain, in addition to statements similar to the one quoted
1. 247 S.C. 112, 145 S.E2d 922 (1966).
2. For a statement of the doctrine in South Carolina see, 6 S.C.L.Q. 96,
102 (1953).
3. Corbin v. Cherokee Realty Co., 229 S.C. 16, 91 S.E2d 542 (1956);
Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 71 S.E.2d 509 (1952); Billings v. McDaniel,
217 S.C. 261, 60 S.E.2d 592 (1950).
4. Corbin v. Cherokee Realty Co., supra note 3, at 25, 91 S.E.2d at 546.
5. Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 119, 145 S.E2d 922,
925 (1966).
6. 217 S.C. 261, 60 S.E.2d 592 (1950).
7. 223 S.C. 545, 77 S.E.2d 212 (1953).
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above, the following, "he [the lot owner] is at once entitled
to have all such streets and alleys opened for his use, necessary
to the enjoyment of his property.""
By omitting all reference to this sentence in those decisions,
the court now would seem to intend to allow any lot owner
qualifying under this rule to successfully oppose any variance
from the plat in the layout of streets or other passageways,
regardless of the actual damage or inconvenience to him.
B. Easements in Gross-Transferability
In Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale9 the court took an oppor-
tunity to add a new dimension to the law surrounding easements
in gross in South Carolina. Prior to this decision, the court had
consistently held that easements in gross are of a personal
nature, are not transferable, assignable or divisable, and die
with the owner thereof.10 The effect of this unswerving posi-
tion has been that litigation concerning transferability has here-
tofore been restricted to discerning whether a certain easement
was one appurtenant or in gross (absent further restrictions in
the granting instrument).11
In Ragsdale the fact that the right-of-way concerned had no
terminus on the easement holder's land-the presence of which
is a sine qua non for appurtenance in this state-2-disposed of
any question as to the nature of the easement. The right claimed
was in a roadway leading from a public road to a river landing,
and had been reserved by appellant Ragsdale's grantor, the
Williams Furniture Corp., for the purpose of allowing it to
continue certain logging operations. The court found, from the
language of the deed between Williams and the appellant, that
the original parties had intended that Williams be able to trans-
fer the right-of-way.
Though this intention would ordinarily have been meaning-
less, the court held that when the terms of the instrument made
the easement in gross assignable and the easement was one of a
commercial character, its alienability would be upheld.
8. Billings v. McDaniel, 217 S.C. 261, 265, 60 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1950);
Newton v. Batson, supra note 7, at 549, 77 S.E.2d at 213. (Emphasis added.)
9. 246 S.C. 414, 143 S.E.2d 803 (1965).
10. Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124, 28 S.E.2d 644 (1940); Brasington v.
Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 141 S.E. 375 (1927).
11. See Safety Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Lyles, 131 S.C. 542, 128 S.E. 724 (1925).
12. Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124, 130, 28 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1940) ; Bras-
ington v. Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 245, 141 S.E. 375, 382 (1927).
[Vol. 19
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The distinction, said the court, lies in the fact that an ordi-
nary easement in gross is merely for personal enjoyment. An
easement of this type for commercial purposes, however, is to
promote economic benefit rather than personal satisfaction and,
in line with the view expressed in the Restatement of Prop-
erty, 18 is transferable.
II. NuisAcE
The "balance of convenience" doctrine, with respect to the
law of nuisances, is recognized to some degree in almost all of
the states.14 Though it is sometimes suggested that the relative
rights of individuals should be balanced before issuing an in-
junction,' 5 the usual practice is to balance only when the success
of an injunction-seeking plaintiff would be contrary to public
interests and convenience. 16
South Carolina's position on this doctrine, despite the em-
phatic, all inclusive language of some decisions, would still seem
to be unsettled.'
7
In Dill v. Dance Freight Lines'8 our court was asked to
change the stolid position indicated by its previous decisions.
The fact situation was that respondent Dill's house was con-
stantly being dirtied by clouds of dust- emanating from appellant
freight line's unpaved truck terminal. Respondent sought, and
was granted, damages and a prohibitory injunction.
Appellant's principal line of argument was that, though based
on ample precedent, a statement by the trial judge-"The jury
having found for the plaintiff; the plaintiff is entitled to an
injunction"'0--was a statement of law no longer valid nor in
13. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 489 (1936).
14. See, e.g., Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933);
Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (1948) ; Can-
field v. Quayle, 170 Misc. 621, 10 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1939).
15. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., supra note 14, at 338.
16. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 16 (1950).
17. References in other parts of this section will demonstrate the language
referred to. As to the "unsettled" state of the law, this writer has been unable
to discover any South Carolina case in which public and private interests
were so opposed that the granting of the injunction would have been contrary
to the public welfare. The issue has arisen only once and then was avoided
because the public interest could be served in another way. State v. Columbia
Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 63 S.E. 884 (1908). In this case a pipe to
carry drinking water to the city of Columbia was held a nuisance because it
obstructed a navigable waterway, but other ways were found to conduct the
water to its destination.
18. 247 S.C. 159, 146 S.E.2d 574 (1966).
19. Id. at 162, 146 S.E.2d at 575. The court cited Threatt v. Brewer Mining
Co., 49 S.C. 95, 26 S.E. 970 (1897).
1967]
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keeping with new trends in the law of nuisance. He argued
that the trial court should have taken additional testimony with
reference to the balance of convenience and advantage between
the parties.
The court disagreed, and repeated the constitutional basis for
the South Carolina position:
Whatever may be the doctrine in other states, under the
provisions of the Constitution of this state, that private
property shall not be taken for private use without the con-
sent of the owner, the court could not have considered, in
deciding whether to grant or refuse the injunction, the
question raised ... as to the balance of convenience .... 20
The court also cited the fairly recent decision of Davis V. Pal-
metto Quarries Co. where it was said: "The court was influ-
enced to strike the quoted allegations because of their apparent
purpose to raise the irrelevant question of balance of convenience
and advantage, and we agree." 21 At least insofar as private
nuisances are concerned, it still does.
In another nuisance action, that of Welborn v. Page,2 2 land-
owners brought a suit to enjoin defendants from locating an
automobile wrecking yard on certain property. The plaintiffs
insisted that such an activity would constitute a nuisance.
The court first noted that, on the facts before it, the proposed
business would not constitute a nuisance per se, though it could
become one per accidens. The fact that a certain activity may
become a nuisance if carried on in a negligent or careless
fashion, however, is no grounds for granting an injunction. It
must appear that a nuisance will inevitably or necessarily result
before the proposed activity will be enjoined.2 3 Furthermore,
so long as the operation is a lawful one, the fact that neighbor-
ing property values are lowered is no indication that a nuisance
exists.
24
20. Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 7, 66 S.E. 117, 118
(1909).
21. 212 S.C. 496, 500, 48 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
22. 147 S.C. 554, 148 S.E.2d 375 (1966).
23. Id. at 561, 148 S.E.2d at 379; Strong v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 240
S.C. 244, 125 S.E.2d 628 (1962).
24. Welborn v. Page, 147 S.C. 554, 561, 148 S.E2d 375, 381 (1966) ; Strong
v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., supra note 23, at 256, 125 S.E.2d at 634.
[Vol. 19
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III. EM4IENT Domwn
As is the usual case, the principal problems arising in the
eminent domain area were (1) is the loss one for which the gov-
ernment must repay the owner and (2) what shall be included
in determining the owner's loss?
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Alliso70 5 presented
the court with an opportunity to extend a rule to rural areas
already settled for urban landowners.
Respondent Allison owned a tract of land which bordered on
U.S. Highway 29. The highway department, pursuant to its
plans to construct a controlled access superhighway over the old
highway 29 roadbed, had instituted condemnation proceedings.
The result of these proceedings, inter alia, was that Allison was
no longer to have direct access to the main highway, but would
now have to travel some seven-tenths of a mile along a "frontage
road" to the nearest highway entrance. He sought compensation
for the loss of this access.
The court observed that in this state the "right of access" has
long been recognized as a property right, and though preceding
cases have dealt only with urban property, the principle is
equally applicable to rural lands.2 6 The fact that the plaintiff
is able to reach the highway by another route will affect only
the amount of his damages, not his right to recover.27 The
measure of that damage is the adverse effect the loss of access
has on the fair market value of the property.28
In South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Touchberry29 the
court gave a good indication of what is encompassed by the
25. 246 S.C. 389, 143 S.E.2d 800 (1965).
26. Id. at 393, 143 S.E2d at 802. The court also found what was interpreted
to be legislative support for its decision in the South Carolina Code, § 33-217
(1962), the pertinent parts of which read:
Acquisition of property for controlled access facilities; rights of abutting
owners-The Department may acquire such lands and property, includ-
ing rights of access, as may be needed for controlled access facilities by
* . . condemnation, in the same manner as now . . . authorized by law
for acquiring property or property rights in connection with other State
highways.
And at § 33-219.3 which provides for judicial review of the Highway De-
partment's decisions to close access roads-"Provided, however, that the above
procedure . . . shall in no wise abrogate or deny any property owner's rights
as to relief under any existing law relating to the condemnation of property."
27. Ibid. Accord, Sease v. City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d
683 (1963) ; Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S.C. 395, 45 S.E.2d 603 (1947).
28. 246 S.C. 389, 392, 143 S.E.2d 800, 801 (1965).
29. 248 S.C. 1, 148 S.E.2d 747 (1966).
1967]
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words "any special damages" in section 33-135 of the code,30
which provides for the damages to be considered when comput-
ing a landowners recompensable loss. It should be remembered
at the outset that the only measure of damage done is the decline
in the fair market value of the land on the basis of its most
advantageous and profitable use-no allowance is made for loss
of future profits.3 '
In Touchberry the highway department had constructed a
controlled access highway across the plaintiff's land. The plain-
tiff asked that in assessing the value of the damage the jury be
allowed to consider four elements of "special damage," namely;
increased traffic noise at the landowner's residence, loss of breeze
because of the elevation of the new highway, loss of view for the
same reason, and circuity of travel between the portions of his
farm now separated by the highway. The court held that when
a part of a tract is physically appropriated, special damages,
including all detrimental consequences of the taking and use of
the land, may be considered in determining the diminution of
the remainder's value. The breadth of the rule as it now exists
in South Carolina is indicated by the court's quoting with ap-
proval the following from Nichols, Eminent Domain: "The
different elements of damage to remaining land recoverable
when part of a tract is taken are as numerous as the possible
forms of injury.
32
Lindsey v. City of Greenville3 3 simply added another factual
example of what constitutes a "taking for public use" within the
meaning of article 1, section 17, of the Constitution of South
Carolina. The plaintiff owned land just below a dam con-
structed by the city. Subsequent to an unusually hard rain the
dam's floodgates were opened to protect the defendant's project
and the excess water from the reservoir flooded the plaintiff's
land, destroying a bean crop planted thereon.
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-135 (1962). "Actual value and special damages to
be considered.-In assessing compensation and damages for rights of way,
only the actual value of the land to be taken therefor and any special dam-
ages resulting therefrom shall be considered."
31. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Bolt, 242 S.C. 411, 131 S.E.2d
264 (1963).
32. 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.24 at 556 (3d ed. 1962).
33. 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E.2d 863 (1966).
[Vol. 1
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The city, relying on Collins v. City of Greenville,3 4 sought to
establish that this was an isolated occurrence, not likely to hap-
pen again nor of a permanent nature, and therefore not a "tak-
ing" within the meaning of the constitution. The court rejected
this argument, pointing out that the dam was a public project
and that the plaintiff's loss had been caused by the regular
operation of the project. Finally, since it appeared that this
inundation would in all probability recur, the destruction of the
crop was held to be a "taking for public use" within the meaning
of the constitution.
IV. CovEwAwTs FOR Ti=
Lancaster v. Smithco, Ino.85 presented the converse of the
situation (as regards the effect on the rights of the parties of
a plat which is referred to in a deed) in Blue Ridge Realty Co.
v. Williamson,"8 discussed elsewhere in this article.
A general rule, well settled in South Carolina, is that a gen-
eral warranty deed includes a covenant that the land is free
from all encumbrances not expressly excepted from its provi-
sions. 7 The requirement that any exceptions be incorporated in
the deed itself is not relaxed by reason that the grantee has
knowledge of an encumbrance prior to the time of conveyance.3 8
In the instant case the plaintiffs had purchased a house and
lot from the defendant, receiving a general warranty deed which
described the lot "as shown" on a certain recorded plat. At the
time of the transaction a gas pipeline corporation held an ease-
ment across the lot. The easement had been duly recorded and
was shown by a dotted line upon the plat to which the plaintiffs
were referred on their deed.
The court held that the reference, though sufficient to incor-
porate the plat for the purpose of determining metes and
34. 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E2d 704 (1958). In this case the plaintiff's build-
ings were damaged when city-owned sewer lines became clogged, causing
sewage to back up and overflow commodes in the buildings. The court dis-
allowed recovery under eminent domain theories since the acts were of a
temporary nature, constituted an isolated instance and arose from no positive
act of the city.
35. 246 S.C. 464, 144 S.E.2d 209 (1965).
36. 247 S.C. 112, 145 S.E.2d 922 (1966).
37. Lessly v. Bowie, 27 S.C. 193, 3 S.E. 199 (1887); Jeter v. Glenn, 9
Rich. L. 374 (S.C. 1856).
38. Sanders v. Boynton, 112 S.C. 56, 98 S.E. 854 (1919).
1967]
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bounds, 3 was not enough to except the encumbrance shown
thereon from the guarantees of the general warranty.
V. EJECO3MNT
The common law practice of allowing an unlimited number
of actions for ejectment40 is no longer recognized in South
Carolina. Section 10-2402 of the code limits the plaintiff to two
trials on the same cause of action. It changes no other part of
that common law doctrine, however, so that no issue decided at
the first trial of the matter is res judicata to the second.41
In Ladd v. DuPre42 everything was in order for bringing the
second suit-it was an action for the recovery of the possession
of real property and the costs of the first action were paid-
except that the plaintiff was the defendant in the first trial.
Having suffered an adverse judgment in the first suit, the
former defendant brought this action and sought to avoid a
defense of res judicata by arguing that the provisions of section
10-2402 apply to either party in an action for ejectment.
The court, analyzing the section in the light of its common
law background, rejected the plaintiff's reasoning, saying that
the section simply meant "that a party out of possession, who
loses his first action, shall have a second action, but [the section]
was never intended to modify the doctrine of res judicata."43
VI. ZONING
When a landowner seeks to force a municipality either to
grant him a variance or change the zoning ordinance itself, the
usual formula for solving the problem has been to ascertain
whether the ordinance is so unreasonable as to impair or destroy
constitutional rights.44 Rusk v. City of Greenville45 gave the
39. S.C. CODE AN . § 60-208 (1962). See also, Blue Ridge Realty Co. v.
Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 145 S.E.2d 922 (1966).
40. This was accomplished by the use of fictitious leases, entries, ousters,
and "tenants" substituted for the real parties in interest. Since the adversary
"tenants" were never the same, the principle of res judicata never applied
and the plaintiff was limited only by the number of fictitious "straw men" he
could imagine-John Doe, Richard Roe, et al. See Carr v. Mouzon, 93 S.C.
161, 76 S.E. 201 (1912); Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Land &
Inv. Co., 42 S.C. 488, 20 S.E. 378 (1894).
41. Williams v. Wannamaker, 122 S.C. 368, 115 S.E. 637 (1923).
42. 247 S.C. 328, 147 S.E2d 253 (1966).
43. Id. at 331, 147 S.E.2d at 255.
44. Bob Jones Univ. v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 351, 133 S.E,2d 843
(1963) ; James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d 661 (1955).
45. 246 S.C. 268, 143 S.E.2d 527 (1965).
[Vol. 19
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court an opportunity to reaffirm this and other principles on
which it has previously adjudicated zoning controversies. Per-
haps the most important of these is the self-restraint to which
the court has committed itself in this area.
There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of
municipal zoning ordinances . . . and where the Planning
and Zoning Commission and the city council of a munici-
pality has acted after considering all the facts, the Court
should not disturb the finding unless such action is arbi-
trary, unreasonable, or in obvious abuse of its discretion....
Likewise, the power to declare an ordinance invalid because
it is so unreasonable as to impair or destroy constitutional
rights is one which will be exercised carefully and cau-
tiously, as it is not the function of the Court to pass upon
the wisdom or expediency of municipal ordinances or
regulations.
46
The facts in this case were that respondent Rush had pur-
chased a lot suitable for commercial purposes on a street whose
frontage was zoned "E-Local Commercial" to a depth of ap-
proximately 150 feet. He had also purchased a strip or "tail"
of land running from the back of this lot to the street on the
other side of the block. The strip measured about 22 feet by 102
feet and lay in an area zoned "IA-1 Single Family Residential".
The respondent asked for and was denied a variance which
would have allowed him to use the strip as a driveway entrance
to a business establishment he planned to erect on the main lot.
The city council announced that they found it "undesirable" to
allow an entry to the proposed business in the residential
neighborhood.
The court declared first, that the actions of the city council
were not unreasonable and second, that the respondent could
not plead unnecessary hardship when he had purchased the strip
with actual or implied knowledge of the zoning ordinance. 47
The court also found that though the purchase of the strip had
reduced the lot from which it was taken to less than the mini-
46. Bob Jones Univ. v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 351, 360, 133 S.E2d
843, 847 (1963).
47. Rush v. City of Greenville, 246 S.C. 268, 278, 143 S.E.2d 527, 532
(1965). "Ordinarily," said the court, "a claim of unnecessary hardship cannot
be based upon conditions created by the owner nor can one who purchases
property after the enactment of a zoning regulation complain that a noncon-
forming use would work an unnecessary hardship upon him."
1967]
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mum square footage required for "A-1 Single Family IResiden-
tial", it was the deliberate and arbitrary act of the respondent
and his grantor that had brought about this result and they
were therefore barred from asserting this fact in their defense.
VII. A UToxoBmE Lmu STATU
Section 45-551 of the South Carolina Code provides that when
a motor vehicle is negligently or lawlessly operated and causes
damage to persons or property, the person suffering such dam-
age shall have a lien on the vehicle, second to that of the state
or county for taxes, for the amount of the damages recoverable
therefrom. It has been decided that such lien dates back to the
time of the injury48 and that the lien attaches as of the moment
of the injury.49 Though he may not have a vested interest in
the vehicle until final judgment is rendered, the injured party's
contingent interest is sufficient to place in him a special interest
as a positive security for the payment of any forthcoming
judgment. 0
In Eo parte First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co.51 the
plaintiff, a native of South Carolina, had been involved in an
accident with a Pennsylvania automobile in North Carolina.
The Pennsylvania vehicle was taken to South Carolina where
the plaintiff commenced an action to have it attached under
authority of section 45-551.
Our court held that despite the absence of territorial restric-
tions in the law, the effect of the statute outside the borders of
the state was governed by the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff 52 which,
as it applies in this case, declares, "that the laws of one
State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far
as is allowed by comity. . . ."8 The result is that the statute
has no effect on the rights of parties arising from an out-of-
state collision. No lien will come into being at the time of the
collision nor when the vehicle is transported into South Carolina.
48. United States v. One 1957 Model Tudor Ford, 167 F. Supp. 864 (E.D.
S.C. 1958); State v. Campbell, 159 S.C. 128, 155 S.E. 750 (1930).
49. Stephenson Fin. Co. v. Burgess, 225 S.C. 347, 82 S.E.2d 512 (1954).
50. Stewart v. Martin, 232 S.C. 483, 102 S.E2d 886 (1958).
51. 247 S.C. 373, 148 S.E2d 373 (1966).
52. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
53. Id. at 722.
[Vol. 19
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VIII. MJI5SCEUL EOUS
Other cases of interest which are not fully commented upon
are:
Elliott v. Snyder, 246 S.C. 186, 143 S.E.2d 374 (1965). Where
a check given by a purchaser of land was returned to the vendor
marked "drawn against uncollected funds", it was held to be
incumbent upon the vendor to attempt to collect the amount by
redeposit of the check before he could consider the contract null
and void for default in payment.
First Baptist Churh v. Turner, 248 S.C. 71, 149 S.E.2d 45
(1966). The words "unto the said Baptist Bethel Church and
their successors as long as the said Baptist Bethel Church shall
continue the worship of God at that place" were held to
constitute a fee simple conditional estate, that by converting it
to other uses the fee had been lost, and that continued claim by
the church for sixty years had resulted in an ouster of the
grantor's heirs and perfection of title by adverse possession in
the church.
Miller v. Rodgers, 246 S.C. 438, 144 S.E.2d 485 (1965). Lan-
guage in a will providing that on the death of a life tenant the
testator's "living children" and the children of any deceased
child should take the remainder, share and share alike, was
held to give these persons contingent interests in a per capita
distribution of the property. The language gave no vested inter-
est since the class would not be determined until the death of
the life tenant.
Jeffords v. Berry, 241 S.C. 347, 147 S.E.2d 415 (1966). Held
section 57-301 of the South Carolina Code to mean that a con-
veyance will be set aside when the transfer is made with actual
intent to defraud creditors (intent imputable to grantees)
regardless of consideration. The conveyence will likewise be
set aside when no intent to defraud is shown but there is no
consideration; any consideration, even that which is "grossly
inadequate" will suffice in the absence of fraud.
J. SPRATT WHE, IV
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